A granular partition is a way of dividing up, or classifying, or mapping a certain portion of reality. We characterize partitions at two levels: as systems of cells and subcells, and in terms of their relation to reality. We define a notion of well-formedness for partitions, and we give an account of what it means for a partition to project onto objects in reality. We continue by classifying partitions along three axes: (a) in terms of the degree of correspondence between partition cells and objects in reality; (b) in terms of the degree to which a partition represents the mereological structure of the domain it is projected onto; and (c) in terms of the degree of completeness with which a partition represents this domain. On this basis we define a notion of identity for partitions.
Introduction
Imagine that you are standing on a bridge above a highway checking off the makes and models of the cars that are passing underneath. Or that you are a postal clerk dividing envelopes into bundles, or a laboratory technician sorting samples of bacteria into species and subspecies. Or imagine that you are making a list of the fossils in your museum or of the guests in your hotel on a certain night. In each of these cases you are employing a certain grid of cells, and you are recognizing certain objects as being located in those cells. We call such a grid of cells a granular partition. We shall argue that granular partitions are involved in all listing, sorting, counting, cataloguing and mapping activities.
The theory of granular partition as it is developed in this paper is intended to serve as an alternative to set theory both as a tool of formal ontology and as a framework for the representation of human common-sense ontologies. Currently it is the naïve portion of set theory that is used in almost all work on common-sense reasoning and in related investigations of natural language semantics. Kinds, sorts, species are standardly treated as sets of their instances; subkinds as subsets of these sets. Set theory nicely does justice to the granularity that is involved in our sorting and classification of reality by treating objects as elements of sets, i.e. as single whole units within which further parts are not recognized.
But set theory is also not without its problems, not the least of which is that it supports no distinction between natural granular totalities (such as the species cat) and such ad hoc totalities as, for example, {the moon, Napoleon, justice}. Set theory also has problems when it comes to dealing with the fact that biological species and similar entities may remain the same even when there is a turnover in their instances. For sets are identical if and only if they have the same members. If we model the species cat as the set of its instances, then this means that cats form a different species every time a new cat is born or dies. If, similarly, we model an organism as the set of its cells, then this means that it becomes a different organism whenever cells are gained or lost.
Set theory also has problems when it comes to dealing with relations between granularities. An organism is a totality of cells, but it is also a totality of molecules, and it is also a totality of atoms. Yet the corresponding sets are distinct, since they have entirely distinct members.
More recently, attempts have been made to solve some of these problems by using mereology as a framework for ontological theorizing. Mereology is better able to do justice in realistic fashion to the relations between wholes and their constituent parts at distinct levels of generality. All the above-mentioned totalities (of cells, molecules, atoms) can be recognized, when treated mereologically, as being one and the same. Mereology has one further advantage over set theory as a tool for the sort of middle-level ontological theorizing which the study of common-sense reasoning requires, namely that it does us not require that, in order to quantify over wholes of given sorts, one must first of all explicitly specify all the parts.
On the other hand, however, mereology, too, has its problems. Above all it does not have the machinery for coping with the phenomenon of granularity; for if we quantify over wholes in a mereological framework, then we thereby quantify over all the parts of such wholes at all levels of granularity. Mereology can mimic the advantages of settheory in this respect only if we depart from realism and make the idealizing commitment to atomism. (Galton 1999 ) Set theory and mereology are then in practice indistinguishable, since each whole becomes isomorphic to a certain set of atoms.
The theory of granular partitions presented in what follows is the product of an effort to build a more realistic, and also a more general and flexible, framework within which to represent the results of sorting and classification, embodying the strengths of both set theory and mereology while at the same time avoiding their respective weaknesses.
Types of Granular Partitions
Some types of granular partitions as we shall here conceive them are flat: they amount to nothing more than a mere list. Others are hierarchical: they consist of cells and subcells, the latter being contained within the former. Some partitions are built in order to reflect independently existing divisions on the side of objects in the world (the subdivision of hadrons into baryons and mesons, the subdivision of quarks into up, down, top, bottom, charm, strange). Other partitions -for example the partitions created by nightclub doormen or electoral redistricting commissions -are themselves such as to create the corresponding divisions on the side of their objects, and sometimes they create those very objects themselves. Quite different sorts of partitions -having cells of different resolutions and effecting unifyings and slicings and reapportionings of different typescan be applied simultaneously to the same domain of objects. The people in your building can be divided according to gender, zip code, social class or social security number. Or they can be divided according to tax bracket, blood type, current location, golf handicap, Erdös number, or blood cesium level. Maps, too, can impose subdivisions of different types upon the same domain of spatial reality, and they employ icons which represent objects in granular fashion (which means that they do not represent the corresponding object parts). Maps will turn out to be important examples of granular partitions in the sense intended here.
As will be clear from what follows, our notion of granular partition is only distantly related to the more familiar notion of a partition defined in terms of equivalence classes. Firstly, our partitions can include more structure in the form of hierarchically arranged subcells and supercells. Second, it is possible to define a partition in terms of an equivalence relation only where the relevant domain has already been divided up into units (the elements of the set with which we begin). However it is the very process of division into units -either through the recognition of bona fide wholes in reality, or through the imposition of fiat subdivisions or discretizations upon continuous gradations -which our present theory is designed to illuminate. Our notion of granular partition is also more flexible than the standard notion in that it is able to capture formally the different ways in which our classifications and listings of objects in reality can convey partial knowledge. The Periodic Table of the Elements, which employs empty cells as placeholders for chemical elements not yet synthesized, is a perfectly acceptable partition in the sense developed here.
In Smith and Brogaard (2000) the notion of granular partition was introduced as a generalization of David Lewis's (1991) conception of classes as the mereological sums of their constituent singletons. Granular partitions, as we conceive them, are the mereological sums of their constituent cells. The cells within a granular partition may however manifest a range of properties which singletons lack. This is because, where a set is directly defined in terms of its members, a granular partition as we conceive it is a device that is defined independently of any objects which might fall within the scope of its constituent cells. The latter thus have their own intrinsic identity conditions, determined via systems of labels or via positions within a grid. The cells of a partition are what they are independently of whether there are objects located within them or not. A map of Middle Earth is different from a map of the Kingdom of Zenda, even through there is in both cases precisely nothing on the side of reality upon which these maps would be projected.
Division into units, counting and parceling out, mapping, listing, sorting, pigeonholing, cataloguing are activities performed by human beings in their traffic with the world. Partitions are the cognitive devices designed and built by human beings to fulfill these various mapping and classifying purposes. Just as when we point our telescope in a certain direction we may fail to find what we are looking for, so when we point our partition in a certain direction it may be that there are no objects located in its cells. There may, in this sense, be empty cells within a partition. This does not mean that the theory of partitions recognizes some counterpart of the set theorist's empty set (an entity that is contained as a subset within every set). For the empty set is empty by necessity; a cell in a partition, in contrast, is at best empty per accidens; it is empty because of some failure on our part.
Partition theory reflects a rather modest, commonsensical attitude to ontology. Each granular partition is to be considered as a cognitive instrument, or as an artifact constructed for some specific human purpose. By embracing the axioms of set theory the set theorist becomes committed to an entire hierarchy or sets, sets of sets, and so on, ad infinitum. There is no corresponding hierarchy within the theory of granular partitions, which is thus appreciably weaker than set theory in its mathematical power. Partition theory puts partitions and objects in two entirely separate realms. Partitions themselves are never objects. Thus partition theory has no counterpart of the distinction between two ways in which one set can be contained within another: on the one hand as element, on the other hand as subset. In what follows we aim to provide a framework for ontological theorizing in which debates over set-theoretical artifacts (arising, for example, in connection with the status of the hierarchy of transfinite sets) can be avoided.
Granular Partitions as System of Cells

A Bipartite Theory
Our basic formal ontology of granular partitions will have two orthogonal parts: (A) a theory of the relations between cells and the partitions in which they are housed; (B) a theory of the relations between partitions and objects in reality. The counterpart of (A) in a set-theoretic context would be the study of the relations among subsets of a single set; the counterpart of (B) would be the study of the relations between sets and their members. When developed in a set-theoretical framework, theories (A) and (B) are not independent. This is because the standard subset relation is itself defined in terms of the set-membership relation (x is a subset of y means: all the members of x are members of y). In the context of partition theory, in contrast, these two relations are defined independently of each other. Partition theory thus departs from the extensionalism of set theory (without, however, embracing any commitment to possible worlds or other devices of modal logic).
Our strategy in what follows will be to define a series of master conditions belonging to theory (A) and theory (B) respectively, and which -for the purposes of the present paper -all partitions will be assumed to satisfy. In later sections we will add further conditions, sastified by some partitions but not by others.
The Subcell Relation
Theory (A) is effectively a theory of well-formedness for partitions; it studies properties partitions have in virtue of the relations between and the operations performed upon the cells from out of which they are built, independently of any reference to reality beyond. Cells in partitions may be nested one inside another in the way in which, for example, the species crow is nested inside the species bird, which in turn is nested inside the genus vertebrate in standard biological taxonomies. We say that one cell, z 1 , is a subcell of another cell, z 2 , if the first is contained in the second ('cell' is 'Zelle' in German), and we write z 1 ⊆ z 2 in order to designate this relationship. We can then state the first of several master conditions on all partitions as follows:
MA1: The subcell relation ⊆ is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
Each cell is, trivially, a subcell of itself, and if two cells are subcells of each other then they are identical. Note that the subcell relation holds between two cells independently of whether there are any objects located in them. It holds, intuitively, in virtue of the cell labels and of the ways these labels are intended by the users of the partition.
Existence of a Maximal Cell
We define a maximal cell of a partition A ('partition' is 'Aufteilung' in German) as a cell satisfying:
where 'Z(z, A)' means that z is a cell in the partition A. (In what follows we shall omit the condition Z(z, A) in cases where it is clear that we are talking about cells within some fixed partition A.) We now demand that MA2: Every partition has a unique maximal cell in the sense of DMax.
The motivation for MA2 is very simple: it turns on the fact that a partition with two maximal cells would either be in need of completion by some extra cell representing the union of these cells, or it would not be one partition at all, but rather two separate partitions, each of which would need to be treated in its own right within the framework of our theory.
The maximal cell of a partition is such that all the cells in the partition are included in it as subcells. MA2 implies that there are no partitions which are empty tout court in that they have no cells at all. We also call the unique maximal cell of a partition its root, r(A).
Finite Chain Condition
The transitivity of ⊆ generates a nestedness of cells inside a partition in the form of chains of cells satisfying z 1 ⊃ z 2 ⊃… ⊃ z n , with z 1 as root. We shall call the cells at the ends of such chains minimal cells or leaves, and define:
Another important aspect of a partition is then: MA3: Each cell in a partition is connected to the root via a finite chain.
In symbols:
does not rule out the possibility that a given cell within a partition might have infinitely many immediate subcells (also called daughter cells). Enforcing finite chains thus leaves open the issue as to whether partitions themselves are finite. Our view of partitions as artefacts built by cognitive agents in their everyday activities of mapping and classifying will mean, however, that we shall here lay our primary focus on examples of finite partitions.
If, in counting off the cars passing beneath you on the highway, your checklist includes one cell labeled red cars and another cell labeled Chevrolets, we will rightly feel that there is something amiss with your partition. One problem is that you will almost certainly be guilty of double counting. Another problem is that there is no natural relationship between these two cells, which ought properly to belong to distinct partitions. As a step towards rectifying such problems we shall insist that all partitions must satisfy a condition according to which every pair of distinct cells within a partition stand to each other either in the subcell relation or in the relation of disjointness. In other words:
MA4: If two cells within a partition overlap, then one is a subcell of the other.
Or in symbols:
∃z: (z ⊆ z 1 and z ⊆ z 2 ) → z 1 ⊆ z 2 or z 1 ⊃ z 2 .
From MA3 and MA4 we can prove by a simple reductio that the chain connecting each cell of a partition to the root is unique.
Partition-Theoretic Sum and Product of Cells
Cells stand to each other in mereological relations. The subcells of a cell are also -on the conception we are here defining -parts of the cell. What happens when we take the mereological products and sums of cells within a partition? In regard to the mereological product of two cells matters are rather simple. This product exists only when the cells overlap mereologically, which means, by MA4, only when they have at least one subcell in common. This means that the mereological product, z 1 * z 2 , of cells z 1 and z 2 , if it exists, is in every case just the smaller of the two cells.
In regard to the mereological sum of cells z 1 + z 2 in contrast, it is a more difficult situation which confronts us. Given any pair of cells, the corresponding mereological sum does indeed exist, since the axioms of mereology allow unrestricted sum-formation. The first thing that we note, however, is that if z 1 and z 2 are cells within a given partition, then z 1 + z 2 is not itself necessarily a cell within that same partition. There is no cell in our standard biological partition of the animal kingdom labeled rabbits and jellyfish, and there is no cell in our standard geopolitical partition of the surface of the globe labeled Hong Kong and Algeria.
To make sense of these matters we need to distinguish the mereological sum of two cells from their partition-theoretic sum. We can define the latter as follows. The partitiontheoretic sum z 1 ∪ z 2 of two cells in a partition is the smallest subcell within the partition containing as subcells both the cells with which we begin, i.e., it is the least upper bound of z 1 and z 2 with respect to ⊆. (By MA2 and MA4 we know that this is always defined and that it is unique.) Notice that this partition-theoretic sum is in general distinct from the mereological sum of the corresponding cells. (The partition-theoretic sum of the cells labeled rabbit and lion is the cell labeled mammal in our partition of the animal kingdom.) In every case however we know that z 1 + z 2 is at least part of z 1 ∪ z 2 (Smith 1991) . If we define the partition-theoretic product, z = z 1 ∩ z 2 , of two cells, analogously, as the largest subcell shared in common by z 1 and z 2 , i.e., as the greatest lower bound of z 1 and z 2 with respect to ⊆, then it turns out that this coincides with the mereological product already defined above.
Mereological sum and product apply to both cells and objects; partition-theoretic sum applies only to cells. In what follows we shall use the following symbols for the two sets of relations:
Partition-theoretic (for cells) Mereological (for cells and for objects) Sum
When restricted to cells within a given partition ⊆ and ≤ coincide, and so also do ∩ and *. We can think of ⊆ as the result of restricting ≤ to the natural units within the partition. We can think of set theory as amounting to the abandonment of the idea that there is a distinction between natural units and arbitrary unions.
Trees
Philosophers since Aristotle have recognized that the results of our sorting and classifying activities can be represented as those sorts of branching structures which mathematicians nowadays called trees. Trees are directed graphs without cycles. They consist of nodes or vertices and of directed edges that connect the nodes. That the edges are directed means that the vertices connected by an edge are related to each other in a way that is analogous to an ordered pair. Here we are interested specifically in rooted trees, which is to say: trees with a single topmost node, to which all other vertices are connected, either directly or indirectly, via edges. In a rooted tree, every pair of vertices is connected by one and only one chain (or sequence of edges). We shall think of the directedness of an edge as proceeding down the tree from top to bottom (from ancestors to descendants). That a tree is without cycles means that, if we move along its edges, then we will always move down the tree and in such a way that, however far we travel, we will never return to the point from which we started. The connection between partitions and trees will now be obvious: it is a simple matter to show that every finite partition can be represented as a rooted tree and vice versa. To construct a tree from a finite partition we create a graph by mapping the cells z i of the partition onto nodes v i within the graph and by introducing a directed edge from vertex v i to v j if and only if the cell z i has cell z j as an immediate subcell. That this is always possible follows from the fact that the subcell relation is well defined (by MA1) and from the fact that chains z 1 ⊇ z 2 ⊇… ⊇ z n are always finite (MA3). It remains to show that the resulting graph is a rooted tree. (a) There is a largest cell of the partition, r(A) (by MA2), and the corresponding node in the graph is its root or topmost node. (b) The graph structure is connected (by MA3). (c) The graph structure is acyclical (MA4). (d) there is a unique path between any two vertexes, since there is a unique path between the root and each node (by MA3 and MA4). The complementary reconstruction of a partition from its tree representation is obvious.
We can represent a partition not only as a tree but also as a simple sort of Venn diagram. In a Venn diagram partition cells are represented as topologically simple and regular regions of the plane. Our partitions are Venn diagrams within which regions do not intersect. (Conversely every array of non-intersecting, possibly nested regions in the plain can be transformed into a tree in such a way that each region is represented by a node in the tree, and each directed link in the tree represents an immediately contains relation between a corresponding pair of nested regions.) In the remainder we will often think of partitions as such planar maps (they are Venn diagrams without overlapping), and the minimal cells correspond to the smallest regions within such diagrams.
Granular Partitions in their Projective Relation to Reality
Projection
Partitions are more than just systems of cells. They are constructed to serve as inventories or pictures or maps of reality, and in this they are analogous to the latticed grills purported to have been used by Renaissance artists as aids to the faithful representation of three-dimensional objects on the two-dimensional plane of a painting. (Smith 2001a) They are analogous also to propositions (Elementarsätze) as described by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. A proposition, for Wittgenstein, is built out of simple signs (names) arranged in a certain order. Each name stands in a projective relation to a corresponding object in the world: it cannot fail to strike its target. If a proposition is true, then its simple signs stand to each other within the proposition as the corresponding objects stand to each other in the world. It is in this sense that a true atomic proposition is a picture, as Wittgenstein puts it, of a state of affairs in reality. That a proposition is a complex of names arranged in a certain order is in our present context equivalent to the thesis that a partition is a complex of cells arranged in a certain order.
A proposition is a complex of names 'in its projective relation to the world.' (Tractatus, 3.12). And so for us here: a partition is a complex of cells in its projective relation to the world, a relation which may be effected either directly by the user of the partition -for example in looking through the cells of the grid and recording what objects are detected on the other side -or indirectly, with the help of proper names or other referring devices such as systems of coordinates or taxonomic labels.
For Wittgenstein it is guaranteed a priori for every name that there is some unique object onto which the name is projected. From the perspective of the theory of granular partitions, in contrast, projection may fail. That is, a partition may be such that -like the partition cataloguing Aztec gods -there are no objects for its cells to project onto. Works of fiction may be conceived as involving partitions of this kind.
Here, however, we are interested primarily in partitions which do not project out into thin air in this way. We write 'P(z, o)' as an abbreviation for: cell z is projected onto object o. We can also, if the context requires it, write 'P A (z, o)' to indicate that the projected of z onto o obtains in the context of partition A. In what follows we shall assume that a unique such projection is defined for each partition. In a more general theory we can weaken this assumption, for example by allowing projections to vary with time while the partition remains fixed. We might then write 'P A,t (z, o)' for: z is projected onto o in partition A under the projection relation in force at time t. (Smith and Brogaard (to appear)) Such variation of projection for fixed partition is involved in all sampling activity. Consider, for example, what happens when we use a territorial grid of cells to map the presence of birds of given species in given areas from one moment to the next.
Location
If projection is successful, then the object upon which a cell is projected is located in that cell. The term 'location' is derived from the spatial context, and one important inspiration of our theory is the study of location relations in spatial contexts. One motivating example of a location relation within our theory is the relation between a given spatial object (either stationary, such as a railway station, or moving, such as a train) and an icon on a map. Other motivating examples are of a non-spatial sort: they include the relation between an instance and its kind or the relation between a customer and the corresponding record in a database.
We can compare a partition with a lighting rig projecting down onto an orchestra during the performance of a symphony. Each cell of the partition corresponds to some spotlight in the rig. Some cells (spotlights) will project upon single players, others onto whole sections of the orchestra (string, wind percussion, and so forth). One cell will project upon the orchestra as a whole. Note that the spotlights do not hereby create the objects which they cast into relief. When once the rig has been set, and the members of the orchestra have taken their places, then it will be an entirely objective matter which objects (individuals and groups of individuals) are located in which illuminated cells.
In what follows we make the simplifying assumption that objects are exactly located at their cells (that spotlights never partially illuminate single players or sections). Compare the way in which Wyoming is exactly located at the cell 'Wyoming' in the partition of the US into States or the way in which your brother Norse is exactly located at the cell 'Norse' in your partition (list) of your family members. In a more general theory we shall liberalize the location relation in such a way as to allow also for partial or rough location (Casati and Varzi 1995 , Bittner and Stell 1998 , Bittner and Smith 2001 . In this more general theory we will be able to deal, for example, with the location of an object like Yellowstone Park in relation to the grid of US States.
Transparency
When projection succeeds, then location is what results. Projection and location thus correspond to the two directions of fit -from mind to world and from world to mindbetween an assertion and the corresponding truthmaking portion of reality. (Searle 1983 , Smith 1999 ) Projection is like the relation which holds between your shopping list and the items which, if your shopping trip is successful, you will actually buy. Location is like the relation which obtains between the items you have bought and the new list your mother makes after your return, as she checks off the items you have brought back with you.
The formula 'L(o, z)' abbreviates: object o is located at cell z. (And again where this is required we can write 'L A (z, o)' for: o is located at z in partition A.) Location presupposes projection: an object is never located in a cell unless the object has already been picked out as the target of the projection relation associated with the relevant partition. But successful projection -by which is meant the obtaining of the projection relation between a cell and an object -also presupposes location, so that where both L and P obtain they are simply the converse relations of each other. We have now reached the point where we can formulate the first of our master conditions on partitions from the perspective of theory (B), which for the sake of clarity we divide into two parts:
Here and in what follows initial universal quantifiers are taken as understood.)
MB1 and MB2 tell us that a partition projects a given cell onto a given object if and only if that object is located in the corresponding cell. Very many partitions -from automobile component catalogues to our maps of states and nations -have this quality without further ado. We shall call them transparent partitions, a notion which we can define in the obvious way as follows:
MB1 and MB2 jointly ensure that objects are actually located at the cells that project onto them. Notice however that a transparent partition, according to our definition, may still have empty cells. A list of the members of your local football team does not lose its quality of transparency because one of the players has, unbeknownst to the compiler of the list, died. A component catalogue does not lose its quality of transparency because given components are, for longer or shorter periods, out of stock. Empty cells may also be needed in the context of scientific partitions in order to leave room for what, on the side of the objects, may be discovered in the future. (Think, again, of the Periodic Table. ) Empty cells may similarly be needed to cover up for temporary lapses in memory. You are attempting to account for the people at your party last night. Your partition consists of six cells labeled: John, Mary¸ Phil, Chris, Sally, and anyone else you might have forgotten. Assume that John, Mary, Phil, Chris and Sally is a complete listing of all the people at the party. Your anyone else cell is then empty.
Functionality Constraints (Constraints pertaining to Correspondence to Objects)
Projection is Functional: The Confused Schoolboy
The notion of transparency is still rather weak. Thus it is consistent with ambiguity on the side of the cells in relation to the objects they target, that is with the case where one cell projects onto two distinct objects. An example of the sort of problem we have in mind is the partition created by a lazy schoolboy studying the history of the Civil War in England. This has one cell labeled 'Cromwell' -and so it does not distinguish between Oliver and his son Richard. Another example might be the partition utilized by those who talk of 'China' as if the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China were one object.
To eliminate such ambiguity we lay down a requirement to the effect that each partition must be such that its associated projection is a functional relation:
For partitions satisfying MB3, cells are projected onto single objects (one rather than two). Consider the left part of Figure 1 . The dotted arrows can occur in partitions satisfying merely MB1-2 but not in partitions also satisfying MB3. Notice, though, that projection might still be a partial function, since MB3 does not rule out the case where there are empty cells. To impose the functionality of projection on all partitions is in one respect trivial. For we can very easily convert a partition A which does not satisfy MB3 into one which does, as follows. If z is a cell in A which does not satisfy MB3, then we create a new partition A′ in which the counterpart of z projects upon the mereological sum of the objects in the projection of z in A. This account seems, indeed, to do justice to what is involved in the confused schoolboy case, namely that Richard and Oliver are run together into one composite human being.
Location is Functional: The Morning Star and the Evening Star
Consider a partition having root cell labeled 'heavenly bodies' and three subcells labeled: 'The Morning Star', 'The Evening Star', and 'Venus', respectively. As we know, all three subcells project onto the same object. This partition is perfectly consistent with the conditions we have laid out thus far. Its distinct subcells truly, though unknowingly, project onto the same object. It is not unusual that we give different names (or coordinates, or class-labels) to things in cases where we do not know that they are actually the same. A good partition, though, should clearly be one in which such errors are avoided.
Partitions manifesting the desired degree of correspondence to objects in this respect must in other words be ones in which location, too, is a functional relation:
In partitions that satisfy MB4, location is a (possibly partial) function, i.e., objects are located at single cells (one rather than two). Consider the right part of Figure 1 . The dotted arrow can occur in partitions satisfying MB1-2, not however in partitions also satisfying MB4. The location function is partial, since partitions are in general not omniscient. This corresponds to what was said above about the domain of a partition. As MB3 rules out co-location (overcrowding), so MB4 rules out co-projection (redundancy). Note that analogues of co-location and co-projection are not even formulable within a set-theoretic framework.
Correspondence of Mereological Structure
MB1 and MB2 are, even when taken together with MB3 and MB4, still very weak. They tell us only that, if a cell in a partition projects upon some object, then that object is indeed located in the corresponding cell. They do not tell us what happens in case a cell fails to project onto anything at all. MB1-4 thus represent only a first step along the way towards an account of correspondence to reality for partitions. Such correspondence will involve two further dimensions: of structural mapping, and of completeness. We will discuss completeness in partition-theoretic terms below. First we need to address our attention to the topic of structural mapping.
Recognizing Mereological Structure
An object o is recognized by a cell z if and only if z is projected onto o and the object o is actually located at z. More generally, a partition recognizes a given object if and only if it has a cell that recognizes that object (Smith and Brogaard 2001) . We shall sometimes use the term 'recognition' as a synonym for 'projection/location' in what follows. Intuitively, recognition is the partition-theoretic analogue of the standard set-membership relation. Partitions are granular in virtue of the fact that a partition can recognize an object without recognizing all its parts. Partitions embody the selective focus of our mapping, classifying, and listing activities. To impose a partition on a given domain of reality is to foreground certain objects and features in that domain and trace over others.
Partitions -think again of Venn diagrams -are designed to reflect the basic partwhole structure of reality through the fact that the cells in a partition are themselves such as to stand in relations of part to whole. This means that, given the master conditions expressed within the framework of theory (A) above, partitions have at least the potential to reflect the mereological structure of the domain onto which they are projected. And in felicitous cases this potential is realized.
That we distinguish between the recognition (foregrounding, selection) of objects on the one hand and the reflection of mereological structure on the other hand is not an arbitrary matter. In Tractarian semantics we distinguish between projection and isomorphism. In set theory we distinguish, for any given set, between a domain of elements and the set-theoretic structure imposed on this domain. Just as it is possible to have sets consisting entirely of Urelemente, so it is possible to have partitions built exclusively out of minimal cells (and one root cell). Such partitions amount, simply, to lists of the things that are recognized by their cells, with no mereological structure on the side of these objects being brought into account.
Consider the diagram (a) in Figure 1 . This shows a partition consisting of two minimal cells z 1 and z 2 projecting onto objects o 1 and o 2 . Diagrams (b) and (c), too, satisfy the master conditions we have laid down thus far, for the latter allow both for disjoint cells to be projected onto what is not disjoint (case b) and also for disjoint objects to be located in cells which are not disjoint (case c). Cases like (b) we shall in fact allow. This is in keeping with the notion that minimal cells are the (relative) atoms of our system, and thus such as to remain neutral with regard to any internal mereological structure on the side of their objects. Cases like (c) on the other hand seem to fly in the face of a fundamental principle underlying the practice of hierarchical classification, namely that objects recognized by species lower down in a hierarchical tree should be included as parts in what is recognized by the genera further up the tree. The basic principle which must be satisfied by all partitions is that they must not misrepresent the mereological relationships between the objects which they are projected onto. We first of all define the following relation of representation of mereological structure between pairs of cells: We now impose a new master condition: MB5 All partitions are mereologically structure preserving in the sense of DS2.
Note that even MB5 is still very weak. Its effect is entirely negative: it merely ensures that partitions do not misrepresent the mereological relationships between their objects. But partitions might still be blind to (trace over) such relationships. Two minimal cells might project onto objects which stand to each other in any one of the entire range of possible mereological relations (parthood, proper parthood, disjointness, and overlap). And pairs of cells z 1 and z 2 which do not stand to each other in the subcell or overlap relation are likewise neutral as to the mereological relations between their objects. This means that the corresponding partition does not know (or does not care) how o 1 and o 2 are related, which means that we are entitled to infer nothing at all about the mereological relations among the corresponding objects.
Consider, for example, a partition that contains cells that recognize John and his arm, i.e., L(John, z 1 ) and L(John's arm, z 2 ). Then cell z 1 need not be a proper subcell of the cell z 2 , for the partition may not know that the object located in z 2 is properly designated as John's arm. Or consider a partition containing two cells that recognize, respectively, mammals and whales. Suppose that this is a partition constructed at a time when the status of whales as mammals was not yet recognized. The cell labeled whales is not, then, included as a subcell of the cell labeled mammals. But the partition can still satisfy our conditions laid down so far. This is so, for example, if the cell that recognizes whales is a subcell of the cell recognizing animals but not a subcell of any other subcell of the cell recognizing animals (Partition A 1 in Figure 3 ). If the cell that recognizes whales were also a subcell of the cell that recognizes fish, for example, then the partition would not remain neutral but would rather misrepresent the mereological relationship between these two species (Partition A 2 in Figure 3 ). Partitions may trace over mereological relationships between the objects they recognize, but MB5 is strong enough to ensure that, if a partition tells us something about the mereological relationships on the side of the objects which it recognizes, then what it tells us is true. Notice that partition A 2 still satisfies MB1-4.
Consider a domain consisting of two regions, x and y, that properly overlap, i.e., x * y = v and x * y ≠ x and x * y ≠ y (where * denotes mereological intersection). Consider now a partition that recognizes x and y, i.e., L(x, z 1 ) and L(y, z 2 ). Assume further that z 1 and z 2 do not stand in any subcell relation to each other, i.e., their partition-theoretic intersection is empty. We can now distinguish two cases that still satisfy our conditions MB1-5 set out above: (1) our partition does not recognize v; (2) it recognizes v but traces over its mereological relationships to x and y. At the level of theory (A) we have explicitly excluded the possibility that cells which are not subcells of each other overlap (MA4). This reflects the fact that the tree structure of our partitions rules out cycles in their graph-theoretic representation. Condition MB5 is thus, like our other master conditions on partitions, satisfied in case (1) as well as in case (2).
An example of case (2) is provided by the case of Germany and Luxemburg, which overlap at their common border on the River Our. The river is part of both countries. Mapmakers normally have no facility to represent cases such as this, and so they either adopt the policy of not representing such common regions at all (the border is represented as a line which we are to imagine as being without thickness), or they recognize the region constituted by the river on the map but trace over its mereological properties. Larger-scale maps often embrace a third alternative, which is to misrepresent the relations between Germany and Luxemburg by drawing the boundary between the two countries as running down the center of the river. Note that given the conditions on granular partitions presented here, we, too, are not able to do full justice to the case in hand (since it represents a violation of our condition to the effect that if two cells overlap then only because one is a subcell of the other). As is illustrated in Bittner and Smith (2001) , however, our present framework is designed to provide the flexibility needed to cope with such deviations from the basic tree-structure of well-behaved partitions.
The Domain of a Partition
That upon which a partition is projected is a certain domain of objects in reality. We shall conceive the domain of a partition as a mereological sum. It is, as it were, the total mass of stuff upon which the partition sets to work: thus it is stuff conceived as it is prior to any of the divisions or demarcations effected by the partition itself. The domains of partitions will comprehend not only individual objects and their constituents (atoms, molecules, limbs, organs), but also groups or populations of individuals (for example biological species and genera, battalions and divisions, archipelagos and diasporas) and their constituent parts or members. Partitions can be used to impose a division into discrete units upon continuous domains, for example by creating temperature or frequency bands. Spatial partitions, for example maps of land use or soil type (Frank at al. 1997) , are another important family of partitions in the sense here advanced. The domains of such partitions are the mereological sums of the corresponding spatial regions.
This generality of the theory of partitions allows a correspondingly general reading of the term 'object'. Here we take an object to be any portion of reality: an individual, a part of an individual, a class of individuals (for example a biological species), a spatial region, a political unit (county, polling district, nation), or even (for present purposes) the universe as a whole. An object in the partition-theoretic sense is everything (existent) that can be recognized by some cell of a partition.
Objects can be either of the bona fide or of the fiat sort . Bona fide objects exist independently of human partitioning activity. Fiat objects are objects which exist only because of such partitioning activity. In some sense partition cells do not only recognize their fiat objects, but the latter are in fact created through the very projection of partition cells onto a corresponding portion of reality. Examples are the States of Wyoming and Montana, or the partition of a population into persons belonging to distinct tax brackets. Once fiat objects have been created in this way, however, subsequent partitions may simply recognize them (without any object-creating effect), just as there are partitions which simply recognize bona fide objects. (Smith, 2001a) We are now able to specify more precisely what we mean by 'domain of a partition.' Our representation of partitions as trees and our condition on reflection of structure (MB5) ensure that all partitions trivially reflect the fact that the objects recognized by their cells are parts of some mereological sum. For MB5 is already strong enough to ensure that everything that is located at some cell of the partition is part of what is located at the corresponding root cell. If one cell pointed outside of what is located at the root cell it would misrepresent the mereological structure of the corresponding domain.
We can thus define the domain of a partition simply as the object onto which its root cell is projected. By functionality of projection and location there can be only one such object.
DD D(A) = p(r(A))
We now demand that every partition has a non-empty domain:
We then say that a partition represents its domain correctly if and only if MA1-5 and MB1-6 hold. Note that correct representation is still rather easily satisfied. (It is achieved already in every simple list provided only that the list allows no double counting and no ambiguous reference of the sort involved in the Oliver and Richard Cromwell case.) This, however, is in keeping with our general view that our classificatory activity in both scientific and common sense contexts is in the normal run of things successful. If there is a single maximal object (the whole universe), then one correct representation thereof has the structure of the Spinoza partition -which consists of just one cell labeled 'everything'. Correct representations, as we see, can be highly partial. A partition with just three cells: a root cell, labeled 'animals', and two subcells, labeled 'dogs' and 'cats', represents its domain correctly. But even if the given partition represents its domain correctly with respect to the mereological sum of all animals, it falls far short of a certain desirable completeness.
The Granularity of Granular Partitions
A correct representation is not necessarily a complete representation. Indeed, since partitions are cognitive devices, and cognition is not omniscient, it follows that no partition is such as to recognize all objects. It is this feature that is captured by our terminology of granular partitions. Partitions characteristically do not recognize the proper parts of the whole objects which they recognize; for example they do not recognize parts which fall beneath a certain size. It is the cells of a partition which carry with them this feature of granularity. Because they function like singletons in set theory, they recognize only single whole units, the counterparts of set-theoretic elements or members. If a partition recognizes not only wholes but also one or more parts of such wholes, then this is because there are additional cells in the partition which do this recognizing job. Consider, for example, a partition that recognizes human beings and has cells that project onto John, Mary, and so forth. This partition does not recognize parts of human beings -such as John's arm or Mary's shoulder -unless we add extra cells for this purpose. Even if a partition recognizes both wholes and also some of their parts, it is not necessarily the case that it also reflects the mereological relationships between the two. Imagine we are forensic scientists examining photographs taken at a crime scene and that these photographs generate a partition with cells recognizing John, Mary, and an arm. It may then be the case that the state of our knowledge is such that the cell recognizing the arm is not a subcell of the cell recognizing either John or Mary. (If this example seems strained, let the arm be Kosovo and let John and Mary be Serbia and Albania, respectively.)
In relation to this granularity of partitions, we can once more call in the aid of Wittgenstein:
In the proposition there must be exactly as many things distinguishable as there are in the state of affairs, which it represents. They must both possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity … (4.04)
Wittgenstein himself takes care of the issue of granularity by insisting that the world is made up of discrete simples, and by insisting further that all partitions (propositions) picture complexes of such simples. This is a simplifying assumption, which our present theory of granular partitions will enable us to avoid. The latter has the power to represent partitions of arbitrary granularity and also partitions which reflect arbitrary cross-cuttings of a single domain of reality (Smith and Brogaard, to appear). The theory of granular partitions inherits from mereology the feature that it is consistent with both an axiom to the effect that atoms exist and with the negation of this axiom. The theory thus enables us to remain neutral as to the existence of any ultimate simples in reality from out of which all other objects would be constructed via summation. This is due to the fact that partitions are by definition top-down structures. The duality with trees puts special emphasis on this aspect: we trace down from the root until we reach a leaf. A leaf has no further parts within the partition to which it belongs. But it need not necessarily be an atom in the sense that it projects upon something that itself has no parts. The fact that there are leaves simply indicates that the partition does not care about what lies beneath a certain level of granularity on the side of its objects. An object located at a minimal cell is thus an atom only relative to the partition involved.
Partitions are cognitive devices which have the built-in capability to recognize objects and to reflect certain features of the latters' mereological structure. Another important feature of partitions is that they have two ways of tracing over or ignoring this mereological structure: (1) by tracing over mereological relations between the objects which they recognize; (2) by tracing over parts of those objects. (2) is (unless atomism is true) a variety of tracing over that is manifested by every partition. A third type of tracing over arises in reflection of the fact that every partition (even the Spinoza partition) is partial in its focus. In foregrounding some regions of reality each partition thereby traces over everything that is outside this region of focus.
Consider some standard biological partition of the animal kingdom. Our definition of the domain of a partition and our constraint on functionality of projection implies that, besides the species dog also your dog Fido, and also Fido's DNA-molecules, proteins, and atoms are parts of the domain of this partition. But the latter are of course not recognized by the partition itself. It is cases such as this which illustrate why mereology requires supplementation by a theory like the one presented here if it is to serve as a tool of ontology. Partition theory allows us to define a new, restricted notion of parthood that takes granularity into account. This restricted parthood relation is an analogue of partition-theoretic inclusion, but on the side of objects: DRP: x < A y ≡ ∃z 1 ,z 2 : L A (x, z 1 ) and L A (y, z 2 ) and z 1 ⊂ z 2 This means that x is a part of y relative to A if and only if: x is a part of y, and x is recognized by a subcell of a cell in A which recognizes y. (Degen et al., 2001) The usual common-sense (i.e., non-scientific) partition of the animal kingdom contains cells recognizing dogs and mammals, but no cells recognizing DNA molecules. Relative to this common-sense partition, DNA molecules are not parts of the animal kingdom in the sense defined by DRP. Of course, DNA molecules are parts of the animal kingdom in the unrestricted sense.
Structural Properties of Correct Representations
In this section we discuss some of the more fundamental varieties of those partitions which satisfy the master conditions given above and are at the same time true of their associated domains. We classify such partitions according to: (1) degree of structural fit; (2) degree of completeness and exhaustiveness; (3) degree of redundancy.
Structural Constraints
We required of partitions that they at least not misrepresent the mereological structure of the domain they recognize. This constraint is to be understood in such a way that it leaves room for the possibility that a partition is merely neutral about (traces over) some aspects of the mereological structure of its target domain. Taking this into account, we can order partitions according to the degree to which they actually do represent the mereological structure on the side of the objects onto which they are projected. At the one extreme we have (1): partitions that completely reflect the mereological relations holding between the objects they recognize; at the opposite extreme we have (2): partitions that completely trace over the mereological relations holding between the objects they recognize. Between these two extremes there are then (3): a variety of intermediate cases not included under (1) and (2).
A very simple example of (1) is given by a flat list, that is, by a partition having only minimal cells together with a root. Assuming that such a list involves no double counting, it follows that on the side of the objects of such a partition there obtain only the parthood relations between the objects listed and their sum, the domain of the partition as a whole.
Partitions under (1) Partitions satisfying CS are mereologically monotonic. They recognize all the restricted parthood relations obtaining in the pertinent domain of objects. Partitions under (2), which is to say partitions completely tracing over the mereological structure of the domain they are projected onto, are such that if two objects o 1 and o 2 are proper parts in the restricted sense of DRP then the non-root cells recognizing these objects are not subcells of each other. An example is a partition of the animal kingdom represented as a flat list with minimal cells labeled arachnid, chordate, dog, horse, mammal, vertebrate, etc., in the way in which these terms might occur in the index to a zoology text.
Most partitions are of type (3), in the sense that they recognize some, but not all, of the restricted parthood structure of the corresponding domain of objects.
Completeness
So far we have allowed partitions to contain empty cells, i.e., cells that do not project onto any object. We now consider partitions which satisfy the constraint that every cell recognizes some object:
We say that partitions that satisfy CC project completely. Notice that this condition is independent of the functional or relational character of projection and location. Of particular interest, however, are partitions that project completely and in such a way that projection is a total function. These are partitions which satisfy both MB3 and CC. Consider a map of the United States representing its constituent states. There are no nomans lands and every cell projects uniquely onto just one state.
Exhaustiveness
So far we have accepted that there may be objects in our target domain that are not located at any cell. This feature of partitions is sometimes not very satisfying: governments want all their subjects to be located in some cell of their partition of taxable individuals. They want their partitions to satisfy a completeness constraint to the effect that every object in the domain is indeed recognized. In this case we say location is complete. Alternatively we say that the partition exhausts its domain. Unfortunately, we cannot use
to capture the desired constraint. The tax authorities do not (as of this writing) want to tax the separate molecules of their subjects. Trivially, we have:
but this is much too weak, since it asserts only that every object within a given domain that is recognized by a partition is indeed recognized by that partition. It will in fact be necessary to formulate several restricted forms of exhaustiveness, each one of which will approximate in different ways to the (unrealizable) condition of unrestricted exhaustiveness expressed in (*). To see how one such exhaustiveness condition might work, let us introduce a sortal predicate (schema) ϕ that singles out the kinds of objects our partition is supposed to recognize (for example, in the case of the partition of taxable individuals, human beings, rather than proper parts of human beings). We now demand that the partition recognize all of those objects in its domain which satisfy ϕ:
Since we can very simply use any predicate to define a partition over any domain -by setting
-we can also think of CE ϕ as asserting the completeness of one partition relative to another. Note that the idea underlying CE ϕ is closely related to the idea of granularity. Thus one way of formulating a condition ϕ is as a restriction on object size.
The tax office probably does not care too much about empty cells in its partition, nor is it bothered too much by the idea of charging you twice. The main issue is to catch everything above a certain resolution at least once. This is the intuition behind constraints like CE ϕ . If you are a law-abiding citizen, you will accept CE ϕ (where 'ϕ' stands for 'is a citizen'), but you will insist that the partition not locate you in two separate cells, i.e., that you are not charged twice. This means that you want the tax partition to satisfy CE ϕ and MB3. There might be a pedantic clerk in the tax office who does not rest until he has made sure that all empty cells have been removed. Partitions that will satisfy you, the government, and the clerk in the tax office must satisfy CC, CE φ , MB4, and MB3. Projection and location are then total functions (relative to a selected predicate φ) and one is the inverse of the other. Notice that neither of the following holds: (**) if MB4 and CE φ and CC then MB3 (***) if MB3 and CE φ and CC then MB4
A counterexample to (**) is given in Figure 4a ; a counterexample to (***) in Figure 4b , where each depicted object is assumed to satisfy ϕ. 
Comprehension Axioms
The following is the partition-theoretic equivalent of the unrestricted set-theoretic comprehension axiom. For each predicate ϕ there is a partition A(ϕ) whose location relation is defined as follows:
Under what conditions on ϕ can this be allowed? One type of restriction that is relevant to our purposes would allow ϕ to be unrestricted but affirm additional restrictions on objects, for example, in terms of spatial location. Thus we might define a family of spatial partitions A(ϕ, r), where r is some predesignated spatial region, in such a way that ∃z: L A(ϕ, r) (o, z) iff ϕ(o) and o is spatially located in r.
Something like this is in fact at work in the taxation partition (the tax office is interested in human beings bearing a special relation to a specific geographic location). Partitions so constrained are then confined to those with domains consisting exclusively of objects that are located in some region of space. Note that this does not imply a restriction to physical or bona fide objects like cars, planets, or human beings. Fiat objects, too, can be admitted -including the very regions of space which are carved out by our partitioning activity. Of course not every predicate generates a partition under this spatially restricted comprehension axiom. Suppose, for example, that ϕ is a predicate which is true only of non-spatial objects. Or suppose that ϕ is the predicate: 'is not spatially located in r'. No partition is defined in these cases, since we exclude necessarily empty partitions, i.e., partitions whose root cell is so defined that it must fail to project onto some domain (MB5).
Redundancy
Correspondence Redundancy
Partitions are natural cognitive devices and the designers and users of such devices build them to serve practical purposes. This means that they will normally avoid certain sorts of redundancy. Here we distinguish what we shall call correspondence redundancy and structural redundancy. Necessarily empty cells (cells whose labels tell us ex ante that no objects can be located within them) represent one type of correspondence redundancy, which we is excluded by condition CC. Another type of correspondence redundancy we have addressed already in our discussion of the functionality of location. This occurs in a partition with two distinct cells whose labels would tell us, again ex ante, that they must necessarily project upon the very same object. Trivially, a partition should not contain two cells with identical labels.
Structural Redundancy
The following sort of case is not quite so trivial. Consider a partition with a cell labeled vertebrates which occurs as a subcell of the cell labeled chordates in our standard biological classification of the animal kingdom. Almost all chordates are in fact vertebrates. Suppose (for the sake of argument) that biologists were to discover that all chordates must be vertebrates. Then in order to avoid structural redundancy they would collapse into one cell the two cells (of chordates and vertebrates) which at present occupy distinct levels within their zoological partitions.
A constraint designed to rule out such structural redundancy would be:
CR: A cell in a partition never has exactly one immediate descendant.
This rules out partition-theoretic analogues of the set theorist's {{a}}.
Fullness and Cumulativeness
We have distinguished thus far completeness, which has to do with the absence of empty cells, and exhaustiveness, which has to do with the successful capturing of all pertinent objects in a given domain. We now need to introduce a third type of completeness for partitions, which has to do with ensuring that the successive levels within the partition itself relate to each other in the most desirable way. We shall divide this third type of completeness into two sub-types: fullness and cumulativeness. Fullness, intuitively, is a requirement to the effect that each cell z has enough daughter (immediate descendant) cells to fill out z itself. Cumulativeness is a requirement to the effect that these daughter cells are such that the objects onto which they are projected are sufficient to exhaust the domain onto which the mother cell is projected. Fullness, accordingly, pertains to theory (A), cumulativeness to theory (B). Non-fullness and non-cumulativeness represent two kinds of shortfall in the knowledge that is embodied in a partition. Non-fullness is the shortfall which arises when a cell has insufficiently many subcells within a given partition (for instance it has a cell labeled mammal, but no subcells corresponding to many of the species of this genus). Non-cumulativeness is the shortfall which arises when our projection relation locates insufficiently many objects in the cells of our partition. Fullness and cumulativeness are rarely satisfied by our scientific partitions of the natural world. They are satisfied primarily by artificial partitions of the sort which are constructed in database environments.
In the remainder of this section we assume that there are no redundancies in the sense of CR.
Fullness
Consider a partition consisting of three cells, labeled people, Hillary and Bill. Or consider a partition with three cells labeled: mammals, horses and sheep. Both of these partitions are transparent, by our definition; but both are, intuitively, such as to fall short of a certain sort of ideal completeness, which we can express by asserting that the mereological sum of the cells Hillary and Bill (or of the cells horses and sheep) falls far short of the corresponding partition-theoretic sum.
If a collection of subsets of some given set forms a partition of this set in the standard mathematical sense, then these subsets are (1) mutually exhaustive and (2) pairwise disjoint. An analogue of condition (2) holds for minimal cells in our present framework, since minimal cells are always mereologically disjoint (they cannot, by definition, have subcells in common). Condition (1) however does not necessarily hold within the framework of partition theory. This is because, even where the partition-theoretic sum of minimal cells is identical to the root cell, the minimal cells still do not necessarily exhaust the partition as a whole. The mereological sum (+) of cells is, we will recall, in general smaller than their partition-theoretic sum (∪).
We call a cell full relative to its descendant cells within a given partition if these descendants are such that their mereological sum and their partition-theoretic sum coincide. Formally we define:
DFull1
Full(z 1 ) ≡ + z ⊂ z1 z = ∪ z ⊂ z1 z.
Where + z ⊂ z1 z and ∪ z ⊂ z1 z symbolize respectively the operations of applying mereological and partition-theoretic sum for all proper subcells z of the cell z 1 . If we assume that each cell has at least two subcells, i.e., if redundancies in the sense of CR are avoided, then we can prove that ∪ z ⊂ z1 z = z 1 . DFull1 could then be reformulated as asserting that a cell is full if and only if it is identical to the mereological sum of its descendants:
Full(z 1 ) ↔ + z ⊂ z1 z = z 1 . The cell in the top row satisfies DFull1, i.e. it is full relative to the second row; but it is not full relative to all of its descendants, since the mereological sum of the cells George W.'s arm and George W.'s leg is not identical to the cell George W. (and analogously for Laura). The problem arises because if x ≤ y then x + y = y and if x ⊆ y then x ∪ y = y. From this it follows that only the immediate descendants of a given cell z 1 contribute to its mereological and partition-theoretic sums.
We can now define more carefully what it is for a cell to be full relative to all its descendant cells within a given partition A: 
Cumulativeness
We can now define the notion of cumulativeness, which plays the same role in theory (B) which fullness plays in theory (A). The intuitive idea is as follows: a cell is cumulative relative to its immediate descendant cells if the mereological sum of the projections of these immediate descendants is identical with the projection of their partition-theoretic sum. For non-empty and non-minimal cells with at least two immediate descendants we define:
One can see that p(∪ z ⊂ z1 z) = p(z 1 ) holds under the given conditions. Consequently:
Again, Cu(z 1 ) ensures that z 1 is cumulative relative to its immediate descendants. In order to ensure cumulativeness of a cell with respect to all its subcells, we define Another way of expressing this is as follows: a partition is cumulative if and only if it has a basis in objects (the objects projected by its minimal cells), and is then built up in stages in such a way that each non-minimal cell projects onto the mereological sum of the objects projected by its immediate descendants. Again, one can see that if a partition is cumulative with respect to immediate descendants all the way down, then it is cumulative with respect to all its descendants. From the definitions above it follows that cumulative partitions are full and that they do not contain empty cells. To see why all cumulative partitions are full, assume that z 1 is cumulative and non-minimal. We then have + z ⊂ z1 p(z) = p(z 1 ). Recall that we are here assuming that location is functional. From this it follows that + z ⊂ z1 l(p(z)) = l(p(z 1 )) and hence + z ⊂ z1 z = z 1 . Since we have Full(z 1 ) ↔ + z ⊂ z1 z = z 1 , we also have Full(z 1 ). Whence Cu(z 1 ) → Full(z 1 ). (Minimal cells are trivially both cumulative and full.) Thus, mutatis mutandis, if an entire partition is cumulative, then it, too, is also full.
Classes of Partitions
Given our definitions of fullness and cumulativeness, we can now distinguish corresponding classes of partitions and relate these to the notions defined in the previous sections. Because cumulativeness implies fullness, it follows that the following three possible combinations can be distinguished:
Full and cumulative.
Partition: a list of the 50 US States, divided into two sub-lists: the contiguous 48, the non-contiguous 2. Objects: the States themselves. Projection: the obvious 'Utah'-Utah projection relation.
Full and non-cumulative. Partition: an accounting of the people at your party, consisting of three cells labeled: John, Mary¸ everyone else. Objects: John, Mary, Phil, Chris, Sally (this is a complete listing of all the people at the party). Projection: everyone else gets projected onto Phil and Chris. Sally is forgotten.
Non-full and non-cumulative. Partition: you have a terrible hangover, and your accounting of the people at the party consists of four cells: John, Mary, the Irish, the Welsh. As it happens, Sally is Scottish.
Recall that the notions of fullness and cumulativeness are intended to characterize partitions that have no redundancies of the sort defined in CR. Since cumulative partitions do not contain empty cells they satisfy CC. Cumulative partitions are also exhaustive (CE) and mereologically monotonic (CS).
Empty Space
When a cell falls short of fullness, then this means that, while the cell successfully projects onto some given domain, its subcells do not succeed in projecting onto the entirety of this domain. It is then as if there is some extra but invisible component in the cell, in addition to its subcells. We shall call this additional component 'empty space'. Consider the partition depicted in Figure 5 . Here the empty space is that part of z 3 that is not occupied by z 1 and z 2 . Notice that this empty space is a component of z3 but it is not itself a cell. Empty space is that part of a cell that is not covered by its subcells. In a way the notion of empty space is similar to the notion of a hole in the sense of (Casati and Varzi 1995) . A hole requires an object which serves as its host. A hole is in every case a hole in something. In the same sense empty space requires a cell within which it can exist as empty space. A hole is a concavity of a host object where no parts of this host object are to be found. Empty space is a zone within a cell where no subcells are to be found.
A portion of empty space within a partition is like a hole also in the sense that there must be something that potentially fills it. In our case this means: more subcells. If all the empty space in a cell is filled, then the cell itself is full and the empty space has been annihilated. Empty space is inert in the sense that it does not project onto anything. Empty space is normally hidden to the user of the partition in which it exists, for otherwise this user would have constructed a fuller partition. In some cases however a user might deliberately accept empty space in order to cater for the fact that something has been left out (compare Figure 7 above) . Alternatively, the existence of empty space in a given partition might be brought to the attention of the user. We point in a certain direction and ask: What is there? The theory of empty space thereby serves as the starting-point for an ontology of questions (Schuhmann and Smith 1987) : empty space corresponds to a hole in our knowledge.
Fullness and Emptiness
Since we have Full(z 1 ) ↔ + z ⊂ z1 z = z 1 , we also have ¬Full(z 1 ) ↔ + z ⊂ z1 z < z 1 . Consequently we can define what it means for x to be the empty space of the cell z 1 as follows. We first of all define x fills z 1: DFills:
Fills(x, z 1 ) ≡ ¬Full(z 1 ) and x + (+ z ⊂ z1 z) = z 1
The empty space in z 1 is then its smallest filler:
DES: ES(x, z 1 ) ≡ Fills(x, z 1 ) and ∀y: Fills(y, z 1 ) → x ≤ y This means that x is the empty space in z 1 if and only if x fills the space not occupied by the subcells of z 1 and x is disjoint from all subcells of z 1 . We note in passing that minimal cells, on the basis of the definitions above, are either empty (they do not project) or they are completely made up of empty space. ES determines the empty space of a cell uniquely. To prove this, assume ES(x, z 1 ) and ES(y, z 1 ). For simplicity we use 'c' as an abbreviation for '(+ z ⊂ z1 z)'. We can then rewrite ES(x, z 1 ) as: x + c = z 1 and ∀z: z + c = z 1 → x ≤ z, and rewrite ES(y, z 1 ) as: y + c = z 1 and ∀z: z + c = z 1 → y ≤ z. This means that the conjunction of ES(x, z 1 ) and ES(y, z 1 ) is logically equivalent to: ∀z: z + c = x + c → x ≤ z and ∀z: z + c= y + c → y ≤ z. Since x + c = y + c = z + c, we can infer: ∀z: x + c = y + c → x ≤ z and ∀z: x + c = y + c → y ≤ z. This conjunction is logically equivalent to ∀z: x + c = y + c = z + c → (x ≤ z and y ≤ z), where a = b = c is an abbreviation for a = b and b = c and a = c. If this holds for all z, then it also holds for a particular z′ where z′ + c = y + c and ¬∃z 2 : z 2 = z′ * c. Obviously we have z′ ≤ (z′ + c) and since we have z′ + c = x + c we also have z′ ≤ (x + c) and since ¬∃z 2 : z 2 = z′ * c we have z′ ≤ x. And similarly for z′ ≤ y. Together with x ≤ z′ and y ≤ z′, this yields x = z′ and y = z′ and hence x = y.
The presence or absence of empty space is a dimension of a granular partition that is skew to the dimension pertaining to the existence of empty cells. An empty cell is a cell that fails to project. Empty space is a zone within a cell that is not occupied by subcells. A partition might in principle be full and yet consist entirely of empty cells; clearly such a partition would not be cumulative. An important aspect of empty space is that it leaves room for the addition of new knowledge. Consider Figure 5 below, depicting a partition of the animal kingdom consisting of three cells, where z 3 recognizes the animal kingdom as a whole, z 1 recognizes dogs, and z 2 recognizes cats. In terms of partition-theoretic union we have z 1 ∪ z 2 = z 3 , but clearly p(z 1 ) + p(z 2 ) < p(z 3 ). New cells can be inserted into the partition if new species are discovered (e.g., the species indicated by o 3 ).
Empty space from one point of view reflects the potential for adding new knowledge. From another point of view it can be seen as a matter of hidden knowledge. From this perspective it is as if we start from partitions which reflect the way God sees reality. Empty space then covers up what we humans do not yet know. The latter view was developed by Mislove at al. (1900) and resulted in the theory of partial sets. What we call empty space they compare to packaging material. If we remove packaging material we potentially discover new things that were previously hidden from view. Our distinction between cumulative and non-cumulative partitions corresponds very closely to the distinction between 'clear' and 'murky' sets drawn in the theory of partial sets. 
Missing Levels
There is at least one other sort of knowledge shortfall which we shall need to consider in a complete theory of partitions. This arises when there are missing levels within a partition-theoretic hierarchy. A partition of the United Kingdom which mentions regions, counties, towns, etc., but leaves out the cells England, Scotland, and Wales is an example of this sort of incompleteness.
Identity of partitions
Identity, Fullness, and Cumulativeness
Based on the notions of fullness and cumulativeness we are now able to consider the problem of identity of partitions. We start by defining a partial ordering relation between partitions regarding their fullness as follows. Let A and B be partitions. We define
for A and B both full: ∀o,∀z:
Based on this ordering relation we can define an equivalence relations between partitions in the obvious way as follows: Smith and Brogaard (2001) propose an alternative partial ordering relation between partitions, which they define as follows:
with an following equivalence defined by:
A ~ B ≡ A ≤ SB B and B ≤ SB A If we follow Smith and Brogaard and assume:
which postulates that a cell projects onto the same object independently of the partition within which it is lodged, then we can infer:
Given this close relationship between the two approaches we can thus afford to concentrate here exclusively on the relations ≤ F and ≈.
We can distinguish a range of cases regarding the fullness and cumulativeness of A and B which need to be considered if we want to draw conclusions about their identity. We write C A for 'partition A is cumulative', F A for 'partition A is full', and similarly for partition B. We then first of all note that, since cumulativeness implies fullness, it follows that the cases C A & ¬F A and C B & ¬F B cannot occur. Secondly, we note that identical partitions need to have identical fullness and cumulativeness properties. Departures from this condition are indicated by the entries A ≠ B in Table 1 This leaves two interesting cases to be considered: (i) can partitions that have empty or redundant cells be identical? (ii) can partitions that are both neither full nor cumulative be identical?
Identity and Empty Cells
The question of whether or not partitions that have empty or redundant cells are identical cannot be answered without a theory of labeling. This is because corresponding empty cells need to have at least the same labels. We can however address this question informally here. Every empty cell is different from every other. If one thinks that there are dodos, then one makes a different sort of error from the error which one makes if one thinks that there is an intra-Mercurial planet. Empty cells are a sign of the different sorts of failure which arise when we project a partition onto reality. Set theory lacks the machinery to deal with such different sorts of failure.
Consider an inventory of the goods you plan to sell in your not-yet-established chain of beer-brewing stores. This is, surely, different from the inventory of the goods I plan to sell in my not-yet-established chain of wine-marketing stores, and this is so even in the event that our respective plans are never realized.
Consider the partition of the people in your building according to number of days spent behind bars. You can construct this partition -which amounts to a simple array of numbered boxes -prior to undertaking any actual inquiries as to who, among the people in your building, might be located in its various cells. Thus even before carrying out such inquiries you can know that this is a more refined partition than, for example, the partition of the same group of people according to number of years spent behind bars. The two partitions are distinct (and they will remain distinct) even if it should turn out that none of the people in your building has in fact spent any time at all in jail. In both cases all the people in your building would then be located in the cell labeled zero and all the other cells in both partitions would be empty. Yet the two partitions are distinct nonetheless, not least because their respective maximal cells have different labels.
Identity and Empty Space
Can partitions that are neither full nor cumulative be identical? One answer to this question would be to assert that there is no way of answering this question -perhaps it is a case of vague identity -since there might be different ways to fill the empty space. Another approach would be to disregard empty space in defining conditions on identity.
Suppose we have what are outwardly the same, incomplete biological taxonomies used by scientists in America and in Australia at some given time. Suppose these partitions are used in different ways on the two continents, so that, in the course of time, their respective empty space gets filled in different ways. Were they still the same taxonomy at the start?
Conclusions
This paper is a contribution to the formal ontology of granular partitions. We defined master conditions that need to be satisfied by every partition. These master conditions fall into two groups: (A) master conditions characterizing partitions as systems of cells, and (B) master conditions describing partitions in their projective relation to reality.
At the level of theory (A) partitions are systems of cells that are partially ordered by the subcell relation. Such systems of cells are such that they can be always represented as trees, i.e., they are finite, have a unique maximal element, and they do not have cycles in their graph-theoretic representation. But partitions are more than just systems of cells. They are cognitive devices that are directed towards reality.
At the level of theory (B) we take this feature into account and characterize partitions using the relations of projection and location. Cells in partitions are projected onto objects in reality. Objects are located at cells when projection succeeds. We then say that a partition recognizes the objects that are located at its cells. To talk of granular partitions is to draw attention to the fact that partitions are in every case selective in the objects they recognize; even when they recognize some objects, they will trace over others.
Partitions do not only recognize objects, they are also capable of reflecting the mereological structure of the objects they recognize through a corresponding mereological structure on the side of their cell array as defined in theory (A). This does not mean that all partitions actually do reflect the mereological structure of the objects they recognize, however; for it is an important feature of partitions that they are also capable of tracing over mereological structure. There are, for example, large classes of partitions that simply list objects, without caring at all how these objects hang together mereologically.
Our discussion of granularity showed that partitions have three ways of tracing over mereological structure: (1) by tracing over mereological relations between the objects which they recognize; (2) by tracing over the parts of such objects; (3) by tracing over the wholes which such objects form. The tracing over of parts is (unless mereological atomism is true) a feature manifested by every partition, for partitions are in every case coarse grained. Feature (3) reflects the property of granular partitions of foregrounding selected objects of interest within the domain onto which they are projected.
We characterized partitions according to the degree to which they reflect or trace over the mereological structure of the objects they recognize. We also characterized partitions by considering the ways subcells may exhaust (serve as basis for) their supercells (fullness) and by considering the ways objects recognized by partition may exhaust the domain recognized by the partition as a whole. Based on these notions we then made a first attempt to characterize the notion of identity for partitions.
